Ch 2 sec. 2 If Literal Meaning, Why Not Metaphorical Meaning?

For Davidson a theory of language is a theory of use with its purpose being to facilitate communication. Communication occurs when a speaker S's utterances are correctly understood by the interpreter I. So if I understands what S intends to say, then communication, i.e. understanding of a language has taken place. Davidson rejects the concept of language, if language is what philosophers and linguists have claimed that language is. For Davidson, language is shared understanding of utterances. So S and I both bring their own a priori understanding and in the process of communication are able to share their presuppositions with each other. This is what language is for Davidson.

It seems problematic for Davidson to have a concept of language having a literal meaning, since he rejects the notion of semantics as traditionally construed. The traditional concept of semantics is the notion that there are some rules and lexical meanings of words that are finite or fixed. That is, there are some parameters set based upon semantic rules that do not allow for there to be an infinite amount of meanings for a given utterance. Instead Davidson appeals to primary intentions and secondary intentions.

Davidson has two kinds of context-dependence, presemantic and postsemantic. Presemantic context-dependence is assigning a meaning or interpretation to sounds or words. That is the sound of i, could be 'I', 'eye, or 'aye'. Similarly for read, or lead. We use context to determine the meaning of the sounds or words. Postsemantic context-dependency is how an utterance is used, are we warning someone, promise, deceive, threaten, etc. The first meaning of an utterance for Davidson it possesses this meaning during all its uses. Metaphors are both presemantically context-dependent and postsemantically context-dependent. That is, metaphors are not autonomous of its secondary intention, and thus metaphor cannot be meaning.

Davidson things that metaphors are used to present a likeness between two objects. Yet, there is an argument against viewing metaphor as taking a likeness.
(1) Suppose metaphors are truth-valued.
(2) Romeo's utterance u of 'Juliet is the sun' is true if and only if Juliet is P, where P is a feature u makes us notice in virtue of which Juliet resembles the sun.
(3) P cannot be the meaning of u.
(4) Therefore, metaphorical meaning cannot be truth-conditions or propositional content.

However, metaphorical meaning can be something other than the two options ruled out in (4).