It's too much Aristotelian Logic for Justin - well, not any more

So, I was very overwhelmed the other night and some of tonight with my Arisotle paper. As I recently explained the square of opposition, now apply the modal operators 'necessarily' or 'possibly' to the categorical sentences. Quick review: Aristotle has 4 categorical sentences, a e i o. I will list them out
a = All p's are q's
e = No p's are q's
i = some p's are q's
o = some p's are not q's
So now, you take the categorical sentences and add 'necessarily' or 'possibly'. So categorical sentence 'necessarily'a = necessarily all p's are q's. This is de dicto modality, because the sentence 'all p's are q's' is necessarily true, it cannot be false. Now, if I wanted de re modality I would say, 'all p's necessarily are q's'. A de re modality claims that the subject necessarily has the predicate attributed to it. So let's use the example of 'All humans are rational'. A de re expression of this sentence is: 'All humans, necessarily, are rational'. That means that if you are a human, then you are rational. (Now, whether or not rationality is a property of all humans is a different question, this is just an example.)

So the problem with Aristotle's modal logic is that he doesn't do a de re or de dicto modality. What he has is a modalized copula - and I am not really sure about what this is or how it is different from a de re modality. So, if I don't understand the difference by the time I finish writing my paper, I will argue that the author who presents the view of the modalized copula commits the logical fallacy of making a 'distinction without difference'. Otherwise, I will argue in my paper that he presents a sucessful argument.