Aristotle paper

WOO-HOO!!!!

I think that I finally narrowed the topic down for my Aristotle paper. I knew that I was going to write on Aristotelian logic, I knew it would be modal logic... AND NOW I KNOW THAT I AM GOING TO WRITE ON DE RE/DE DICTO MODALITIY!

For those of you who don't know, de dicto is loosely translate as "of what is said" and de re is loosely translated as "of the thing". I'll explain more later.

It is started

I began typing my paper for modal epistemology yesterday - finished 6 complete pages and was partway through a seventh page. It's that time of the semester when I am tired all the time due to stress. Makes it difficult to read because I am tired. Yet, it is a good feeling getting those 6 pages done, but when I think about how soon the semester will be over and how much work I still have to do, my stomach and muscles clench up. Gotta work through the stress. Now, it's time to work on my Aristotle paper.

Ahhh - Aristotelian Logic

So, I'm going to update twice in one day - well, technically it's now Thursday, but I'm still awake.

Aristotle has what is referred to as the square of opposition

A (all p is q) E (no p is q)


I (some p is q) O (some p is not q)

It's called the square of opposition due to the way the axioms are set up. If E is true, the I is false, and vice versa. If A is true, then O is false, and vice versa. If A is true, the E is false, and vice versa, but both A and E can be false. If A is true, then I is true. If E is true, then O is true. It's possible for both I and O to be true. This is the basis of Aristotelian logic.

I'm writing my paper on modal logic, which then adds a 'necessary' or 'possible' before the logic axioms. So, necessarily all p is q, and so forth. Anyway, when I learn more and think more about it, I'll write more =)

Modalities

So, I'm writing a paper on Aristotle's modal logic. I still don't know what I will say about it - only that I am writing on it.

For epistemology I am writing on modal epistemology. Specifically, the modal skepticism of Peter van Inwagen. Modalities are possibilities. In the actual world the Boston Red Sox won the most recent world series, however, it is possible that the Detroit Tigers to have won the world series. This is a particular type of modality called a "counterfactual". What van Inwagen argues is that we don't know what is possible. I am going to examine his argument and hopefully refute him. We have intuitions concernig what is actual, it seems that our intuitions for what is possible isn't different from our intuitions of what is possible.

I keep promising to update my blog more than once a day - hopefully tonight I will update my blog with what I have read and learned. My whole purpose for this blog was to organize my thoughts about what I was reading and writing on. I need to take advantage of the blog.

Not much

Just wanted to update for the sake of updating my blog. Not too much is going on here in Norman, OK. The semester is almost over, I have 2 1/2 weeks to finish writing my last two papers. I haven't really started working on them, but I'll do some reading today, tomorrow, and Monday. Hopefully I'll get a good jump on them this weekend. I'll try and update my blog later today with one of my paper topics.

Ahhh... much better =)

So, now it's off to Borders to read some Conceivability and Possibility - that is, modal epistemology. Also gonna read some Minimal Semantics.

Will it ever stop?

Now I have an ear ache... I think from the allergies, so instead of drainage down my throat or nose, the drainage is in my ear. I forgot how painful ear aches are. I am tired but it is too uncomfortable to sleep. So, I will watch a movie and hopefully, sooner, rather than later, the pressure on my right ear will begin to subside. Hopefully, I don't develop a temperature either... I'm feeling chilled again (ARGH!!)

Somewhat Sick

I couldn't sleep much last night, had the chills, I'm never cold, and last night I couldn't get warm enough. Then today, I've just felt miserable. Not throwing up, but just kinda in a daze. I suppose that it's better to feel like crap now then in a couple of weeks when all of my papers are due. Though, I'm working on a paper that is due this Friday, but it's a draft, so it doesn't have to be good. In my paper I am contrasting/comparing three different views of semantic content. Semantic modesty, semantic skepticism, and one other that hasn't been named yet, and I'm not sure why...

Anyway, I think that I am going to defend a position that is labeled, semantic minimalism and speech-act pluralism. But the great thing about philosophy papers, especially philosophy of language, is that I can write the paper, then come up with my thesis and conclusion after the paper is written. That way I can give a coherent argument.

Logical Form in language

So, for today's class in phil. language we will be discussing what a logical form of a language is. The definition that was set forth by the author of the book that we are reading is as follows:

The logical form of a language is what the grammatical structured demands of logical rules, e.g. the logical implications that result from the use of a language. (This is a loose definition and paraphrase.)

So, this seems similarly related to the problem of negative existentials. If we say that pegasusi don't exist, how can we say that? If we refer to a non-existent object it seems that the statement is frivolous. If we attempt to deny that an object exists, it seems that it must exist in some sense. I think that there is a difference between 'there is' and 'there exists'. Otherwise how can we talk about objects such as pegasusi or squared-circles? This is really a tricky topic. I just woke up, so I'll have to compose better thoughts on this after class.

It's all Semantics - right?

Or is it pragmatics? (To answer the question of this post.)

I think people often claim that something is just semantics when they don't see a distinction between two positions. Let's say there is a position x, and a position y. Both x & y are very similar, yet there is a difference. I think when people claim that it is all semantics what they are claiming for x & y, is that there is a distinction without difference. At first I thought that those who claim that something is all semantics were giving a red herring (a red herring is a distraction from an argument, making a point that isn't relevant to the discussion) but I think that what they are really claiming is that there is a distinction without difference. At least, this would be a charitable interpretation on my part.

I bring these points up, because I am writing a paper on what the semantic content of utterances are. Utterances can include spoken and written sentences. So, how do we determine the semantic content of utterances. I hold to the position that the semantic content of an utterance is determined by the syntactic structure of the utterance. However, some people claim that the semantic content of an utterance is determined by the context in which the utterance was uttered. I think that this position is incoherent. If you think about it, how many times in your life have you uttered the same sentence, with respect to the words and context? Never (this was a rhetorical question). Yet, somehow communication takes place. How can communication occur if the meanings of an utterance and the words in the utterance always change from context to context? I don't know. But don't think that I have just given a knockdown dragout argument refuting context dependent meaning. Remember, right now I am talking about the semantic context of an utterance. What is said (or asserted) is different from the semantic content, as well as what is implicated (implicature).

So, anyway, I hope that my thoughts were somewhat coherent and I will post more as my argument develops.

At least I'm good at something...

I think of all the people I know I am the best at procrastinating. It's 2:40AM I have a re-write for a paper due tomorrow, and I'm finding other stuff to do. What is the matter with me? How did I ever get this far in school? ...Well, at least I like to read.

Back against the wall...

The other night when I was talking to my friend, I told her that to use a sports analogy, it's in the second half, nearing the end of the third quarter, and I'm behind. In order for me to finish well this semester I will have to perform a come from behind victory. This is possible, I had a slight come from behind victory in a class last semester, but I also lost a lead in another class.

So here are my potential paper topics later on this semester.

Truth-Conditional Pragmatics - the role of pyschological factors in semantic content

Aristotle Survey - Aristotle's use of modal logic

Epistemology Survey - modal epistemology (this is the one paper topic that I'm most vague on, hence, this weekend will be spent reading modal epistemology)

Michigan State

My Spartans are back where they belong - in the FINAL FOUR!!!

Go Spartans... though I don't have much hope that they will beat UNC, but that is ok, at least they made the final four. While beating Duke and Kentuckey in the tournament.

Wore Out!!

I've been really tired since arriving in Norman, OK after spring break. While I was on spring break I was attempting to write a paper on Aristotle and enjoy spring break... this is something that I'll never attempt again. Either work on my paper or enjoy spring break - but not both.

So, I really don't have much to say, other than I've been really tired, but now I'm repeating myself.

Back from Vail

Sorry about the AWOL without any warning. I went to Vail for Spring Break. Skied, tubed, and worked on a paper. Anyway, I'll start posting again. Sorry for not warning anyone.

Jonathan Edwards & Justification by Faith

Most baptists would affirm the reformed doctrine of justification by faith. We traditionally define this doctrine as, one doesn't have to do good works to receive salvation from God. This view is usually held against the Roman Catholic (RC) view of salvation, in which protestants claim that RCs hold to salvation by works, i.e. people have to do things to earn their salvation. This is clearly a charicature of RC theology. If you examine the RC beliefs and doctrines they actually assert that grace comes from God to allow us to do good works, but in the end, for a RC salvation comes from the grace of God.

The view that most anti-calvinist baptist pastors hold to is similar to the RC view. Baptists will claim that you have to 'accept Jesus' into your heart. Or they will claim that you need to 'choose God'. Often these pastors and preachers act as if salvation hinges upon an individual making a choice, namely that of choosing to accept Christ. I think that this would need more elaboration, but it seems true that arminian or anti-calvinist pastors have more in common with RC than they do with Calvinist protestants.

Jonathan Edwards viewed justification by faith as a calvinistic doctrine. The only way that one can avoid salvation by works is to hold to the belief that salvation is solely the act of God. If we have to choose God in order to be saved, then it seems that we must do something in which to facilitate our salvation. For Edwards and other calvinists, calvinism defends the doctrine of justification by faith.

This has always seemed to be self-evident to me from the scriptures. I'm glad to know that I stand in the same camp with the greatest American theologian - Jonathan Edwards. This is also a humbling doctrine for many to believe. If there is nothing that we have done to facilitate our salvation, then how much more do we owe thanks to God? Most often, people are just too proud to admit that they would have accepted Christ without intervention by God in the person of the Holy Spirit.

Slackin' off

Well, to all of my readers I apologize for my lax behavior with my blog. For now I have a couple of thoughts.

Jonathan Edwards life - wow, I am inspired. If I ever have a job at a seminary or a Christian evangelical college I will definitely teach a class on the philosophical/theology of Jonathan Edwards. He is definitely pietistic and revivalistic, yet he tempers both of these emotional aspects of his theology with a serious rationalism. George Marsden, the writer of Edwards biography, claims that Edwards was both a medieval and a modern, almost standing in the gap between the two. I have definitely learned a lot about how I would like to do things if I were a pastor.

I'm writing a paper on Aristotle and propositional attitudes. Here's an example of propositional attitudes

Lois Lane loves Superman
Superman = Clark Kent ('=' means identical)
Lois Lane doesn't know that Superman = Clark Kent
Therefore, Lois Lane Doesn't love Clark Kent

What Aristotle claims is that if Lois Lane loves Superman, then logically she loves Clark Kent. Aristotle makes a claim like this:

S knows that Fa
a is the same in essence as b
________________________
S knows that Fb

Aristotle's view is similar to that of John Stuart Mill, or should I say John Mill's view is similar to that of Aristotle's? Anyway, Aristotle's view seems somewhat counterintuitive. If S doesn't know that Fa = Fb then how can S know Fb? This is what confuses me, it seems to make sense, but there is something that seems wrong. If we allow this substitution in the belief of S from Fa to Fb then we can allow this. Let me give a story to explain why I don't think that Aristotle or Mill's view of names works.

Let's say that Commissioner Gordan needs to inform Batman that the Joker has kidnapped Barbara Gordan. So while Bruce Wayne and Commissioner Gordan are having dinner, Commissioner Gordan excuses himself from dinner so he can turn. on the Bat Signal to inform Batman about the kidnapping. Yet, what Commissioner Gordan doesn't know is that Bruce Wayne is identical to Batman. So, unbeknownst to Bruce Wayne the Joker has kidnapped Barbara Gordan, because he is having dinner with Commissioner Gordan and not aware that Commissioner Gordan has turned on the Bat Signal. So, even though Commissioner Gordan wants to inform Batman about the kidnapping, he doesn't inform Bruce Wayne about this while they are having dinner, because Commissioner Gordan doesn't know that Bruce Wayne is identical with Batman.

Abstract submitted...

Here's the abstract that I submitted to the Evangelical Philosophical Society, hopefully they accept it and I can present the full version at the conference in November.

In this paper I will argue that Christian worship entails intentionality and casually efficacious mental content. I will define worship as directing one’s affections towards God. There have not been any plausible materialist (excluding non-reductive materialism) theories of intentionality or mental content. Eliminativism denies intentionality and mental content altogether. The Christian philosopher/theologian must have a plausible theory with respect to how the Christian worship’s God – worship is a necessary element in the believer’s relationship with God. Since mind/body dualism can explain intentionality and causally efficacious mental content, a form of mind/body dualism (not necessarily Cartesian substance dualism) seems to be required by the Christian in order to have a plausible explanation for how worship takes place. Thus mind/body dualism is the default position for the Christian. This places the burden of proof on the Christian materialist to give a Christian explanation of worship without a plausible theory of intentionality and causally efficacious mental content.

God's Will

I had a conversation with a friend today concerning God's will. Both of referenced a book that I can't remember nor can I remember the name of the author. The premise of the book is that God is not concerned with you doing His will, but He is concerned with the type of person that you are. Contemporary Christians often construe God's will in a pagan matter when they think that they have to seek and pray for God's will. God has already revealed His will to us - we already know the type of person that God wants us to be. So when we make decisions, we can ask ourselves if a person of God would do this, but we don't have to pray for God's will. This is similar to the story of the Rich man and Lazarus in Luke, the rich man wants to go back and share the gospel with his family and God asks him, why will they listen to you if they have already ignored the prophets and Moses. This is similar to us with God's will, why will God tell us what His will is - or, to put it differently, why does God NEED to tell us His will - when He has already revealed it to us in the Bible. We know the kind of people that God's wants us to be, why do we need to ask Him again. We need to get busy living lives that bring glory to God, and when decisions arise we will make decisions based upon what brings glory to God

We know what we are supposed to do - sometimes we don't want to do what we are supposed to do so we avoid it with the pretense of seeking God's will.

Speech-Act Theory and Biblical Hermeneutics

I emailed my philosophy of language professor a similar question to the problem that I am going to propose in this post.

Speech-Act theory is a philosophy of language that attempts to describe how we use language. It consists of three main speech-acts:

(1) locution - the actually utterance itself (an utterance can be written or spoken)
(2) illocution - how the hearer understands the utterance
(3) perlocution - if the hearer performs the speech-act

Let me explain the differences between (1), (2), and (3). Take the utterance of:

Shut the door!

The locution will be the actual words of 'shut the door'. The Illocution is whether the hearer understands what the speaker wants her to do. Does the speaker actual intend the hearer to shut the door? The perlocution is if the speaker intends by uttering 'Shut the door!' for the hearer to shut the door, the the hearer will shut the door - to fulfill the perlocution.

Speech-act theory is now prevalent in evangelical theology. Kevin van Hoozer brought speech-act theory into vogue by using it as a means to refute Jacques Derrida, Stanley Fish, Paul Ricouer, and etc. Now, those guys don't deserve to be taken seriously becuase they don't obey the law of non-contradiction. Nor are they good philosophers of language - instead they obfuscate and confuse language. So, van Hoozer somewhat opened pandora's box in theology.

The problem with speech-act theory is that it is radical contextualism. In other words, by using speech-act theory to interpret the Bible may have some problems. Radical contextualism asserts that utterances have no meaning outside of context. So take the utterance used above, 'Shut the door!' We can only know what shut the door means in the context in which it is uttered, we cannot understand it in abstraction. So I don't know if this is bad for being able to worship God or not. Can we say that God is love, becuase we are removing what we know about God from context and placing it into another context. Hence, in every context an utterance means something different. Anyway, if there is something here, I thought that this might be something that I could attempt to get published in a journal. It seems to be a dangerous view for evangelicals to hold to, especially if upon uttering verses from the Bible in a different context, we are saying something different from what the Bible utters.