Bach's Dilemma

(1) If a referring expression functions referringly in some contexts and not in others and that fact is semantically significant, then the expression's semantic contribution to the sentence in which it occurs would have to depend on its sentential context.

(2) But this suggests that its very meaning, which presumably determines its semantic contribution, depends on its sentential context.

(3) The only way to concede that, and this is one horn of the dilemma, would be to abandon the Principle of Compositionality.

(4) The other horn of the dilemma is to accept the dubious implication that referring expressions are systematically ambiguous.

Since the only way to keep (1) is to reject (3) or (4) it seems that we must then reject (1). Bach's claim is that expressions don't refer, rather speaker's refer. So, if it is expressions themselves that refer and they need a context in which to refer from, then it seems that (3) or (4) is true.

On Sense and Reference -- Frege

I have here understood any designation representing a proper name, which thus has as its reference a definite object (this word taken in the widest range), but not a concept or a relation, which shall be discussed further in another article. The designation of a single object can also consist of several words or other signs. For brevity, let every such designation be called a proper name.

The sense of a proper name is grasped by everybody who is sufficiently familiar with the language or totality of designations to which it belongs; but this serves to illuminate only a single aspect of the reference, supposing it to have one. Comprehensive knowledge of the reference would require us to be able to say immediately whether any given sense belongs to it. To such knowledge we never attain.
(Sense & Reference, p. 57-8)

The reference and sense of a sign are to be distinguished from the associated idea. If the reference of a sign is an object perceivable by the sense, my idea of it is an internal image, arising from memories of sense impression s which I have had and acts, both internal and external, which I have performed. Such an idea is often saturated with feeling; the clarity of its separate parts varies and oscillates. The same sense is not always connected, even in the same man, with the same idea. The idea is subjective: one man’s idea is not that of another. There result, as a matter of course, a variety of differences in the ideas associated with the same sense. A painter, a horseman, and a zoologist will probably connect different ideas with the name ‘Bucephalus.’ This constitutes and essential distinction between the idea and the sign’s sense, which may be the common property of many and therefore is not a part or a mode of the individual mind. For one can hardly deny that mankind has a common store of thoughts which is transmitted from one generation to another. (Sense & Reference p.59)

'God' - necessary, a posteriori

I believe that 'God' refers to the divine substance. Furthermore, the divine substance = The Triune God. However, the divine substance = the Triune God is a necessary statement. Yet, OT followers of God were not aware of this meaning of God, therefore the divine substance = the Triune God is an a posteriori statement.

Muslims, God, & the law of non-contradiction

So to review some of the previous discussion, I will explain how 'God' can refer to the divine substance that is the Triune Godhead.

Assuming that we hold to the following three statements:

(1) The Father is God.
(2) Jesus is God.
(3) The Holy Spirit is God.

I'm arguing that 'God' is not a proper name, because it doesn't semantically function like a proper name. An objection was presented to my view that sometimes 'God' is used to refer to the Father in the Bible and that was a problem for my view. In (1)-(3) 'God' occurs in the predicate position, however God cannot be identical to any one person of the Trinity for the following reason, there are properties that God has that any one member of the Trinity lacks. For instance, Jesus died on the cross, however the Father didn't die on the cross. Therefore, God died on the cross, but if we claim that God = the Father, then we commit the heresy of patripassionism (that the Father was crucified).

Here is an analogy to help better explain my view that 'God' refers to the divine substance.

(4) The Atlantic Ocean is water.
(5) The Pacific Ocean is water.
(6) The Indian Ocean is water.
(7) The Artic Ocean is water.

So we can speak about and refer to the Pacific Ocean as water, because it is water, however, the Pacific Ocean isn't identical to water, because the Pacific Ocean isn't identical to the Atlantic Ocean. So just as we can speak of God as Jesus or God as the Father, 'God' is not the name of Jesus or the name of the Father, though it can be used to refer to the Father or to the Son, but this is pragmatic reference and not an issue of semantics (or it may even be what is said).

Muslims affirm that there is one God, Allah. I take this to be a rejection of the Trinity, or to state this in a positive manner, this is an affirmation of a belief in a non-Triune God. Now, if 'God' refers to the divine substance and this divine substance means the Triune God, then clearly Muslims wouldn't refer to the same God that Christians refer to. In other words, 'God' must mean something different for Muslims than it does for Christians. We don't want to attribute any contradictory beliefs to Muslims, especially since they claim that they worship a non-Triune God, then it seems uncharitable to claim that they do worship a Triune God.

However, there is a problem for the Christian theist who claims that Muslims and Christians worship different Gods, since Muslims claim to worship the God of the OT. Yet, Muslims ignore what the NT teaches us about God and which is that God is a Triune God. So by explicitly rejecting a Triune God Muslims have broken the causal chain of reference. Since Israel, didn't explicitly reject a Triune God, then when they uttered the word 'God' they referred to God, although without knowing that God was a Triune God.

Water = H20

If water is identical with H20, then necessarily, water is identical with H20. Analogously, if Christianity is true, then God is identical with the Triune God. Therefore, Necessarily, God is identical with the Triune God. So, although 'God' is a natural kind, 'God' means the Triune God. In other words, the only God that exists, is the Triune God, all other Gods are fictional objects, since there is only one divine substance and no other individual Gods other than the Triune God.

'God' as a Natural Kind

Most people assume that 'God' is a proper name. If this is the case then we ought to apply the semantics to 'God' that apply to other proper names. However, it if isn't a proper name, and instead 'God' is a general term, then the semantics that apply to general terms apply to 'God'. Perhaps the first question we should ask is whether 'God' functions as a proper name. So let's use an example of a proper name:

(1) Bruce Wayne is Batman.
(2) The Dark Knight is Batman.
(3) The Detective is Batman.

The reason why I claim that the 'is' in (1)-(3) is the 'is' of identity is because the predicate term functions as a name. We can apply transivity of identity to (1)-(3) as follows:

(4) Bruce Wayne = The Dark Knight
(5) The Dark Knight = The Detective


Since, (1)-(3) showed that all the names in (4) and (5) were identical to 'Batman' we can assume that 'Batman' is a proper name. So if 'God' is a proper name, then it should function in a similar manner as the examples in (4)and (5)

(6) Jesus is God.
(7) The Father is God.
(8) The Holy Spirit is God.

However, orthodox Christians would reject the following assertions:

(9) Jesus = The Father
(10) The Father - The Holy Spirit

Yet, (6)-(8) shows that the terms in (9) and (10) are identical to God. It seems that the best explanation for the 'is' in (6)-(8) is that all the subject terms are consubstantial with God, that is, the subject terms all share the same substance. So it seems the best way to understand 'God' that 'God' functions as a general term. This is due to the fact that God is a substance. So when we use the word 'God' we refer to a divine substance.

Scooby-Doo, General Terms, & God

According to Nathan Salmon, natural kinds refer to a species or a genus. Natural kinds don't refer to classes because there must be at least one member in a class in a world, w, in order for that class to exist. However, it seems that even in a world that dogs don't exist, 'dog' still refers to the species canine. With this in mind I present the following puzzle:

(1) Scooby-Doo is a dog.
(2) Dog refers to the species canine.
(3) If Daphne kisses Scooby-Doo, then she kisses a canine.
(4) Scooby-Doo isn't a dog, rather Scooby-Doo is a cartoon drawing of a dog, i.e. Scooby-Doo is a fictional object.
(5) The word 'dog' in (1) is ambiguous.

Let's take the following example:

(6) The Greeks worshiped Zeus.
(7) Zeus is a god.
(8) Gods are a species of divine beings.
(9) Therefore, the Greeks worshiped a species of divine beings.

However, (9) is false, once again Zeus is a fictional object, so the intentionality of the Greeks was directed at a fictional object.

Furthermore, if Christianity is true, then God is a divine substance, consisting of three persons (who are all consubstantial). So if this is the case, then 'God' refers to a divine substance. So let's assume that any occurrence of God that doesn't refer to the divine substance refers to a fictional object.

Summer Blogging

I have been reminded about my recent dearth of posts. Hopefully, I can resume my blogging activities since I will be able to resume my philosophical reading.

My Master Argument???

(1) God is a mass term.
(2) Salvation for Christians entails belief in Jesus as Lord. Salvation for Muslims entails belief in the non-triune God (a pure qualitative definite description).
(3) YHWH = The Triune God
(4) The belief in Jesus as Lord entails that one believes that 'God' is a mass-term in this context.
(5) The Muslim use of 'God' occurs in a count noun occurrence.
(6) The Triune God isn't identical to The Non-Triune God.
(7) Therefore, Christians don't believe in the same God as Muslims.

A Partially Descriptive Theory

A partially descriptive name n is semantically associated with both a descriptive property PD and a referent o. The referent o is determined in part by having the property PD and in part by the same nondescriptive mechanisms that determine the reference of ordinary nondescriptive names – for example, by a historical chain of transmission leading back to o. The semantic content of n includes both o and D. The proposition expressed by a sentence n is F is the same as that expressed by the sentence [the x: Dx & x = y] Fx, relative to an assignment of o to ‘y’. This proposition is true at a world w iff o has the properties expressed by D and F at w. To believe this proposition is to believe of o that it has both properties.

-- Scott Soames, Beyond Rigidity (p.88)

Soames' Competence Conditions for Proper Names

In order to be a competent user of a name n of an object o, two things are required. (i) One must have acquired a referential intention that determines o as the referent of n. Two ways in which this may be done are by picking up n from others who used it as a name of o, and intending use n to refer to the same thing they did, or by being independently acquainted with o and introducing n as a name for o. (ii)One must realize that to assertively utter n is F is to say of the referent, o, of n that it "is F."

--Scott Soames, Beyond Rigidity (p. 65)

Somes on Anti-descriptivist Arguments

(1) Semantic Arguments -- "[These] show the referent of a proper name n, as used by speaker s, is not linguistically determined to be the denotation of any description, or set of descriptions associated with n by s."

(2) Epistemic Arguments -- "[These] show that what is known or believed by someone who knows or believes that which is expressed by a sentence s containing a proper name n is different from what is known or believed by someone who knows or believes that which is expressed by a sentence which results from substituting a description for n in s."

(3) Modal Arguments -- "These are intended to show that sentences containing names typically have different truth conditions than corresponding sentences containing descriptions, in the sense that sentences of these two types are typically true in different possible states of affairs."

--Scott Soames, Beyond Rigidity (p.19)

Natural Kinds and Proper Names

I've been thinking a lot lately about how the term 'God' is used in the Bible and in natural language. Take the following occurrences of 'God' in the Bible:

(1) And God saw that it was good.

Clearly (1) 'God' is used to refer to a specific being. It seems as if the occurrence of 'God' in (1) could not be a natural kind but functions similar to the following:

(2) Tiger hunts by using stealth.

What if we changed (2) to the following and made it into a definite description:

(2') The tiger hunts by using stealth.

Now let's (1) into a definite description.

(1') And The God saw that it was good.

Something seems strange about (1') almost as if we are using it to pick out a particular unique being. However, the term 'God' seems to function similarly to 'tiger' in both examples.

Let's see if we can find an occurrence of 'God' as a natural kind.

(3) Who is like you, O Lord, among the gods?

Here specifically (3) is addressing YHWH and it seems to pick out YHWH as one among many gods. However, the speaker is claiming that YHWH is unique among the other gods. Yet, 'gods' is functioning as a natural kind. Similar to the following locution. Let's say that we're talking to Shere Khan and expressing to him is incomparable worth to other tigers.

(4) Who is like you, O Shere Khan, among the tigers?

So clearly 'god' can be used as a natural kind such as 'tiger'. Perhaps the difference between 'God' and other natural kinds is that we often use 'God' as a subject term the same way that we would use a proper name.

My initial intuitions about this are that 'God' is semantically a natural kind term, however, we do use it pragmatically as a proper name or a disguised definite description.

'God', A Prioricity, and Definite Descriptions

The claim that is generally agreed upon is that a = a, is a priori. However, that then means that a = b should also be a priori. So let's examine the following identity claims:

(1) God = The Triune God.

(2) Yahweh = The Triune God.

(3) Yahweh = God.

Of the three claims above, it seems that (3) is probably a priori, perhaps (2), but definitely not (1). Is this because the term 'God' is a description or predicate? Not to reject any of the above identity claims, rather to examine whether a competent language user would know the truth-value of the identity statements a priori.

Davidson on Demonstratives; Stern on Metaphor

One of Josef Stern's main arguments is as follows:

(1) If metaphors cannot be semantic then there are two other options (i) Davidson's view of metaphor, and (ii) pragmatic view of metaphor
(2) The pragmatic view of metaphor does not work,
(3) Hence, Davidson's view of metaphor is the only viable option.
(4) Davidson's theory of demonstratives are context-dependent semantics.
(5) If Davidson has context-dependent semantics for demonstratives, then if metaphor is sufficiently similar to Davidsonian Demonstratives, then metaphor is a semantic feature of language.
(6) Metaphors are sufficiently similar to Davidsonian Demonstratives.

So what is a context-dependent semantic rule? Indexicals and demonstratives are the most commonly used examples. Take the following utterance by Bill Clinton on June 15, 2007:

(7) I am the President of the United States.

Presumably (7) is false. Suppose George W. Bush were to utter the following on June 15, 2007:

(8) I am the President of the United States.

This is a true utterance. Both (7) and (8) have the exact same linguistic and syntactic structure, the only difference is who utters them. Indexicals such as 'I' always refer to the speaker, in that sense indexicals are context-dependent. Similarly to demonstratives such as 'that'.

(9) That is a baseball field.

Depending upon whether 'that' is actually a baseball field will determine the truth-value for (9).

According to Stern the same is true for metaphor. There are semantic rules that constrain the meaning of metaphor. Stern's claim is that metaphor follow some of the semantics of anaphora, that is, metaphor does not depend solely upon speaker meaning.

Ch. 2 sec. 4 Metaphorical/Literal Dependence II: Davidson on Referential Definite Descriptions, Malapropisms, and Metaphor

Metaphor, for Davidson, is like referential definite descriptions. For referential definite descriptions Davidson believes that we can use something, i.e. a sentence, that is literally false to say something true. Keith Donnellan's example is that of reference to a man at a cocktail party. Bert is talking to Ernie about the man in the corner drinking a martini. However, contrary to what Bert utters, the man in the corner is actually drinking water. So the definite description, 'the man in the corner drinking a martini' is actually false, because it is the man in the corner drinking water. Bert does not know all the facts about the man, however, according to Davidson, he does say something true with the false utterance of the definite description. We use sentences for metaphor that are false.

Malapropisms are different from metaphor in that their first literal meaning undergoes a change and then means something different. Yogi Berra once thanked the crowd at Yankee Stadium on Yogi Berra Day "for making this day necessary", when what Berra really meant was possible.

Ch. 2 sec. 3 Metaphorical/Literal Dependence: Davidson's Causal Explanation

Davidson views metaphor as similar to jokes and pictures. Take a joke, if we break down the individual words in a joke, the lexical meanings of the words themselves are not funny, yet the joke as a whole is funny. Metaphors make us see likenesses; the individual words, the constituents of the metaphor don't cause us to see likenesses but the metaphor as a whole does. That is, a metaphor is the totality of the utterance. However metaphors depend upon the ordinary (i.e. lexical) meanings of the words. That is, the utterance of a metaphor is created by the words used to compose the utterance. This creates a problem for Davidson, if the individual words make a metaphor, but the individual words themselves aren't metaphor, then how can metaphor depend upon the words. It seems as if Davidson is committing the fallacy of division. He admits that words have no metaphorical meaning, yet metaphor depends upon the meaning of words.

For Davidson the literal meaning of a sentence is its truth-conditions. Take the following sentence:

(1) Juliet is the sun.

The words keep their literal meaning but the sentence cannot pace Davidson because we don't know what it would mean for the truth of (1) to obtain. In other words, what would it mean for (1) to be literally true. Perhaps it is a category mistake to claim that a person is the sun, or it may be choice negation that (1) is false. We don't know what the world would have to be like in order for (1) to obtain. Davidson may just claim that the sentence is meaningful but false. For Christians this seems to present a problem take the following sentence:

(2) Jesus is the Lamb of God.

This appears to be a biblical metaphor that we would want to claim is true. Perhaps this is reason enough for the Christian to reject the Davidsonian view of metaphor. So for Davidson (2) is literally meaningful and merely false.

Since Davidson claims that it isn't the literal meaning of the sentence that gives rise to metaphor but only the words then changing the word order in a metaphor should not affect the metaphor. For instance:

(3) Man is wolf.

(4) Wolf is man.

According to Davidson (3) and (4) are the same metaphor because they both have the same words. So Davidson rejects that syntactic rules and the structure of the sentence contributes anything to metaphor.

Josef Stern claims that if we take Davidson's claim "the metaphorical depends upon the literal" to mean that the metaphorical use of a sentence depends on its literal meaning, then: (i) the literal meanings of the individual words so used to carry part of the explanatory burden; (ii) the literal truth-conditions of the sentence uttered play no explanatory role; but (iii) certain syntactic or logical-formal properties of the sentence do contribute to or constrain the metaphorical use.

Ch 2 sec. 2 If Literal Meaning, Why Not Metaphorical Meaning?

For Davidson a theory of language is a theory of use with its purpose being to facilitate communication. Communication occurs when a speaker S's utterances are correctly understood by the interpreter I. So if I understands what S intends to say, then communication, i.e. understanding of a language has taken place. Davidson rejects the concept of language, if language is what philosophers and linguists have claimed that language is. For Davidson, language is shared understanding of utterances. So S and I both bring their own a priori understanding and in the process of communication are able to share their presuppositions with each other. This is what language is for Davidson.

It seems problematic for Davidson to have a concept of language having a literal meaning, since he rejects the notion of semantics as traditionally construed. The traditional concept of semantics is the notion that there are some rules and lexical meanings of words that are finite or fixed. That is, there are some parameters set based upon semantic rules that do not allow for there to be an infinite amount of meanings for a given utterance. Instead Davidson appeals to primary intentions and secondary intentions.

Davidson has two kinds of context-dependence, presemantic and postsemantic. Presemantic context-dependence is assigning a meaning or interpretation to sounds or words. That is the sound of i, could be 'I', 'eye, or 'aye'. Similarly for read, or lead. We use context to determine the meaning of the sounds or words. Postsemantic context-dependency is how an utterance is used, are we warning someone, promise, deceive, threaten, etc. The first meaning of an utterance for Davidson it possesses this meaning during all its uses. Metaphors are both presemantically context-dependent and postsemantically context-dependent. That is, metaphors are not autonomous of its secondary intention, and thus metaphor cannot be meaning.

Davidson things that metaphors are used to present a likeness between two objects. Yet, there is an argument against viewing metaphor as taking a likeness.
(1) Suppose metaphors are truth-valued.
(2) Romeo's utterance u of 'Juliet is the sun' is true if and only if Juliet is P, where P is a feature u makes us notice in virtue of which Juliet resembles the sun.
(3) P cannot be the meaning of u.
(4) Therefore, metaphorical meaning cannot be truth-conditions or propositional content.

However, metaphorical meaning can be something other than the two options ruled out in (4).

Chapter 2 Meaning and Use sec. 1

In chapter 2 Josef Stern lays out Donald Davidson's position and arguments for metaphor. Stern's claim is that Davidson's theory of metaphor is the greatest threat to a semantic theory of metaphor, so if Stern can show that Davidson's approach to metaphor fails, we can then begin the argument for the semantic theory of metaphor.

According to Davidson metaphors mean what the words mean in their most literal sense. So the utterance

(1) Juliet is the sun.

is false. This is due to the fact that the words understood literally are false. Davidson is not concerned with what a speaker is saying, asserting, or trying to convey. Furthermore, Davidson rejects speaker meaning, i.e. pragmatics, as a way that metaphors receive their meaning.

Davidson claims that metaphors have no meaning due to the two following reasons: (i) it is not a feature of the word that the word has prior to and independent of the context of use, (ii) unlike literal meaning that explains why all utterances of one sentence have the same truth-conditions, there are no analogous cross-contextual regularities to explain for metaphor: Each metaphorical utterance in its context appears to express a different feature from every other one. So we need a way to have a semantic meaning for metaphors that meet the conditions of (i) & (ii).

Review: Metaphor in Context, by Josef Stern

I am going to begin a blogging series over Josef Stern's book, Metaphor in Context. I don't know how many posts it will last, but I think it will be more than one post for certain. This is a very rich and in-depth book that deserves careful attention to detail and I hope by reading it carefully and precisely that I will gain much information in both the philosophy of metaphor and the philosophy of language.