Aristotle paper

WOO-HOO!!!!

I think that I finally narrowed the topic down for my Aristotle paper. I knew that I was going to write on Aristotelian logic, I knew it would be modal logic... AND NOW I KNOW THAT I AM GOING TO WRITE ON DE RE/DE DICTO MODALITIY!

For those of you who don't know, de dicto is loosely translate as "of what is said" and de re is loosely translated as "of the thing". I'll explain more later.

It is started

I began typing my paper for modal epistemology yesterday - finished 6 complete pages and was partway through a seventh page. It's that time of the semester when I am tired all the time due to stress. Makes it difficult to read because I am tired. Yet, it is a good feeling getting those 6 pages done, but when I think about how soon the semester will be over and how much work I still have to do, my stomach and muscles clench up. Gotta work through the stress. Now, it's time to work on my Aristotle paper.

Ahhh - Aristotelian Logic

So, I'm going to update twice in one day - well, technically it's now Thursday, but I'm still awake.

Aristotle has what is referred to as the square of opposition

A (all p is q) E (no p is q)


I (some p is q) O (some p is not q)

It's called the square of opposition due to the way the axioms are set up. If E is true, the I is false, and vice versa. If A is true, then O is false, and vice versa. If A is true, the E is false, and vice versa, but both A and E can be false. If A is true, then I is true. If E is true, then O is true. It's possible for both I and O to be true. This is the basis of Aristotelian logic.

I'm writing my paper on modal logic, which then adds a 'necessary' or 'possible' before the logic axioms. So, necessarily all p is q, and so forth. Anyway, when I learn more and think more about it, I'll write more =)

Modalities

So, I'm writing a paper on Aristotle's modal logic. I still don't know what I will say about it - only that I am writing on it.

For epistemology I am writing on modal epistemology. Specifically, the modal skepticism of Peter van Inwagen. Modalities are possibilities. In the actual world the Boston Red Sox won the most recent world series, however, it is possible that the Detroit Tigers to have won the world series. This is a particular type of modality called a "counterfactual". What van Inwagen argues is that we don't know what is possible. I am going to examine his argument and hopefully refute him. We have intuitions concernig what is actual, it seems that our intuitions for what is possible isn't different from our intuitions of what is possible.

I keep promising to update my blog more than once a day - hopefully tonight I will update my blog with what I have read and learned. My whole purpose for this blog was to organize my thoughts about what I was reading and writing on. I need to take advantage of the blog.

Not much

Just wanted to update for the sake of updating my blog. Not too much is going on here in Norman, OK. The semester is almost over, I have 2 1/2 weeks to finish writing my last two papers. I haven't really started working on them, but I'll do some reading today, tomorrow, and Monday. Hopefully I'll get a good jump on them this weekend. I'll try and update my blog later today with one of my paper topics.

Ahhh... much better =)

So, now it's off to Borders to read some Conceivability and Possibility - that is, modal epistemology. Also gonna read some Minimal Semantics.

Will it ever stop?

Now I have an ear ache... I think from the allergies, so instead of drainage down my throat or nose, the drainage is in my ear. I forgot how painful ear aches are. I am tired but it is too uncomfortable to sleep. So, I will watch a movie and hopefully, sooner, rather than later, the pressure on my right ear will begin to subside. Hopefully, I don't develop a temperature either... I'm feeling chilled again (ARGH!!)

Somewhat Sick

I couldn't sleep much last night, had the chills, I'm never cold, and last night I couldn't get warm enough. Then today, I've just felt miserable. Not throwing up, but just kinda in a daze. I suppose that it's better to feel like crap now then in a couple of weeks when all of my papers are due. Though, I'm working on a paper that is due this Friday, but it's a draft, so it doesn't have to be good. In my paper I am contrasting/comparing three different views of semantic content. Semantic modesty, semantic skepticism, and one other that hasn't been named yet, and I'm not sure why...

Anyway, I think that I am going to defend a position that is labeled, semantic minimalism and speech-act pluralism. But the great thing about philosophy papers, especially philosophy of language, is that I can write the paper, then come up with my thesis and conclusion after the paper is written. That way I can give a coherent argument.

Logical Form in language

So, for today's class in phil. language we will be discussing what a logical form of a language is. The definition that was set forth by the author of the book that we are reading is as follows:

The logical form of a language is what the grammatical structured demands of logical rules, e.g. the logical implications that result from the use of a language. (This is a loose definition and paraphrase.)

So, this seems similarly related to the problem of negative existentials. If we say that pegasusi don't exist, how can we say that? If we refer to a non-existent object it seems that the statement is frivolous. If we attempt to deny that an object exists, it seems that it must exist in some sense. I think that there is a difference between 'there is' and 'there exists'. Otherwise how can we talk about objects such as pegasusi or squared-circles? This is really a tricky topic. I just woke up, so I'll have to compose better thoughts on this after class.

It's all Semantics - right?

Or is it pragmatics? (To answer the question of this post.)

I think people often claim that something is just semantics when they don't see a distinction between two positions. Let's say there is a position x, and a position y. Both x & y are very similar, yet there is a difference. I think when people claim that it is all semantics what they are claiming for x & y, is that there is a distinction without difference. At first I thought that those who claim that something is all semantics were giving a red herring (a red herring is a distraction from an argument, making a point that isn't relevant to the discussion) but I think that what they are really claiming is that there is a distinction without difference. At least, this would be a charitable interpretation on my part.

I bring these points up, because I am writing a paper on what the semantic content of utterances are. Utterances can include spoken and written sentences. So, how do we determine the semantic content of utterances. I hold to the position that the semantic content of an utterance is determined by the syntactic structure of the utterance. However, some people claim that the semantic content of an utterance is determined by the context in which the utterance was uttered. I think that this position is incoherent. If you think about it, how many times in your life have you uttered the same sentence, with respect to the words and context? Never (this was a rhetorical question). Yet, somehow communication takes place. How can communication occur if the meanings of an utterance and the words in the utterance always change from context to context? I don't know. But don't think that I have just given a knockdown dragout argument refuting context dependent meaning. Remember, right now I am talking about the semantic context of an utterance. What is said (or asserted) is different from the semantic content, as well as what is implicated (implicature).

So, anyway, I hope that my thoughts were somewhat coherent and I will post more as my argument develops.

At least I'm good at something...

I think of all the people I know I am the best at procrastinating. It's 2:40AM I have a re-write for a paper due tomorrow, and I'm finding other stuff to do. What is the matter with me? How did I ever get this far in school? ...Well, at least I like to read.