A Partially Descriptive Theory

A partially descriptive name n is semantically associated with both a descriptive property PD and a referent o. The referent o is determined in part by having the property PD and in part by the same nondescriptive mechanisms that determine the reference of ordinary nondescriptive names – for example, by a historical chain of transmission leading back to o. The semantic content of n includes both o and D. The proposition expressed by a sentence n is F is the same as that expressed by the sentence [the x: Dx & x = y] Fx, relative to an assignment of o to ‘y’. This proposition is true at a world w iff o has the properties expressed by D and F at w. To believe this proposition is to believe of o that it has both properties.

-- Scott Soames, Beyond Rigidity (p.88)

Soames' Competence Conditions for Proper Names

In order to be a competent user of a name n of an object o, two things are required. (i) One must have acquired a referential intention that determines o as the referent of n. Two ways in which this may be done are by picking up n from others who used it as a name of o, and intending use n to refer to the same thing they did, or by being independently acquainted with o and introducing n as a name for o. (ii)One must realize that to assertively utter n is F is to say of the referent, o, of n that it "is F."

--Scott Soames, Beyond Rigidity (p. 65)

Somes on Anti-descriptivist Arguments

(1) Semantic Arguments -- "[These] show the referent of a proper name n, as used by speaker s, is not linguistically determined to be the denotation of any description, or set of descriptions associated with n by s."

(2) Epistemic Arguments -- "[These] show that what is known or believed by someone who knows or believes that which is expressed by a sentence s containing a proper name n is different from what is known or believed by someone who knows or believes that which is expressed by a sentence which results from substituting a description for n in s."

(3) Modal Arguments -- "These are intended to show that sentences containing names typically have different truth conditions than corresponding sentences containing descriptions, in the sense that sentences of these two types are typically true in different possible states of affairs."

--Scott Soames, Beyond Rigidity (p.19)

Natural Kinds and Proper Names

I've been thinking a lot lately about how the term 'God' is used in the Bible and in natural language. Take the following occurrences of 'God' in the Bible:

(1) And God saw that it was good.

Clearly (1) 'God' is used to refer to a specific being. It seems as if the occurrence of 'God' in (1) could not be a natural kind but functions similar to the following:

(2) Tiger hunts by using stealth.

What if we changed (2) to the following and made it into a definite description:

(2') The tiger hunts by using stealth.

Now let's (1) into a definite description.

(1') And The God saw that it was good.

Something seems strange about (1') almost as if we are using it to pick out a particular unique being. However, the term 'God' seems to function similarly to 'tiger' in both examples.

Let's see if we can find an occurrence of 'God' as a natural kind.

(3) Who is like you, O Lord, among the gods?

Here specifically (3) is addressing YHWH and it seems to pick out YHWH as one among many gods. However, the speaker is claiming that YHWH is unique among the other gods. Yet, 'gods' is functioning as a natural kind. Similar to the following locution. Let's say that we're talking to Shere Khan and expressing to him is incomparable worth to other tigers.

(4) Who is like you, O Shere Khan, among the tigers?

So clearly 'god' can be used as a natural kind such as 'tiger'. Perhaps the difference between 'God' and other natural kinds is that we often use 'God' as a subject term the same way that we would use a proper name.

My initial intuitions about this are that 'God' is semantically a natural kind term, however, we do use it pragmatically as a proper name or a disguised definite description.

'God', A Prioricity, and Definite Descriptions

The claim that is generally agreed upon is that a = a, is a priori. However, that then means that a = b should also be a priori. So let's examine the following identity claims:

(1) God = The Triune God.

(2) Yahweh = The Triune God.

(3) Yahweh = God.

Of the three claims above, it seems that (3) is probably a priori, perhaps (2), but definitely not (1). Is this because the term 'God' is a description or predicate? Not to reject any of the above identity claims, rather to examine whether a competent language user would know the truth-value of the identity statements a priori.