According to Kent Bach there are three main domains of reference: (1) semantics, (2) pragmatics, and (3) epistemology. An example that Bach gives is proper names. Proper names would fall under the pragmatic and epistemic categories. Take the name 'John', we can use 'John' to refer to John the Baptist or John Smith. This is what makes it a pragmatic useage of the term 'John'. Also, which John that 'John' refers to seems to be an epistemic category. Hence, this seems to be the explanation that Bach would give as to why proper names fall under the (2) and (3) domains of reference.
To better understand philosophers of language from the 20th century Bach claims that we need to divide facts into three categories. First, there are facts about language. Second, there are facts about language use. Third, there are facts about the thoughts of language users.
For Bach there are two different types of reference, linguistic reference and speaker reference. This correspond with the semantics and pragmatics distinction. Pragmatics is concerned with communication, speaker meaning, and speech acts. Whereas semantic features of an utterance give the meaning of an utterance that a competent user of a language can understand about an utterance, apart from the context in which it was uttered. Semantics is concerned with types, pragmatics with tokens.
Tuesday, June 27, 2006
Saturday, June 10, 2006
Reading Goals part 2: Philosophy of Language (well not entirely...)
In addition to my philosophy of religion/theology reading that I have mapped out over the next 14 months I am also planning on reading some analytic (or some prefer anglophone) philosophy. I am going to being with two books that are an in depth survey of 20th century philosophy up to 1975.
Book 1a - Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Centure, vol. 1: The Dawn of Analysis, by Scott Soames
Book 1b - Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century, vol. 2: The Age of Meaning, by Scott Soames
Book 2 - Thought and Reference by Kent Bach.
Book 3 - Reference and Essence, by Nathan Salmon
Book 4 - Frege's Puzzle, by Nathan Salmon
Book 5 - Beyond Rigidity, by Scott Soames
Book 6 - Reference and Description, by Scott Soames
Book 7 - Descriptions and Beyond, edited by Marga Reimer and Anne Bezuidenhout
Book 8 - Theories of Vagueness, by Rosanna Keefe (note: if you would like to know what vagueness is ask my lovely wife, she can explain to anyone who is interested in vagueness what the sorites paradox is.)
Along with the nine books listed above I also plan on reading an assortment of philosophy articles concerned with philosophy of language and vagueness. We will see how that works out. Right now I am about 1/4 of the way through book 1a will post more on this when I finish...
Book 1a - Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Centure, vol. 1: The Dawn of Analysis, by Scott Soames
Book 1b - Philosophical Analysis in the Twentieth Century, vol. 2: The Age of Meaning, by Scott Soames
Book 2 - Thought and Reference by Kent Bach.
Book 3 - Reference and Essence, by Nathan Salmon
Book 4 - Frege's Puzzle, by Nathan Salmon
Book 5 - Beyond Rigidity, by Scott Soames
Book 6 - Reference and Description, by Scott Soames
Book 7 - Descriptions and Beyond, edited by Marga Reimer and Anne Bezuidenhout
Book 8 - Theories of Vagueness, by Rosanna Keefe (note: if you would like to know what vagueness is ask my lovely wife, she can explain to anyone who is interested in vagueness what the sorites paradox is.)
Along with the nine books listed above I also plan on reading an assortment of philosophy articles concerned with philosophy of language and vagueness. We will see how that works out. Right now I am about 1/4 of the way through book 1a will post more on this when I finish...
Reading Goals - part 1: Philosophy of Religion & Theology
So, it is 14 months and counting until I will be in school again. So I have some major reading that I plan on doing between now and August of 07. So here is the reading that I plan on doing in philosophy of religion/philosophical theology. Upon the completion of a book I will post on here to keep all of my two loyal readers updated on my progress.
Book 1 - The Trinity by Saint Augustine
Book 2 - Summa Contra Gentiles book 4: Salvation, by Thomas Aquinas
Book 3 - Anselm of Canterbury - The Major Works, this is just the compilation of Anselm's philosophical/theological work. The Bishop of Canterbury
Book 4 - and this one is a monster - The City of God, by Augustine
In addition to the 4 books listed above, I am also going to read all of the Faith and Philosophy Journals from January 2002, to whatever is the most recent journal that I have by August 07. Faith and Philosophy is the journal put out by the Society of Christian Philosophers.
Book 1 - The Trinity by Saint Augustine
Book 2 - Summa Contra Gentiles book 4: Salvation, by Thomas Aquinas
Book 3 - Anselm of Canterbury - The Major Works, this is just the compilation of Anselm's philosophical/theological work. The Bishop of Canterbury
Book 4 - and this one is a monster - The City of God, by Augustine
In addition to the 4 books listed above, I am also going to read all of the Faith and Philosophy Journals from January 2002, to whatever is the most recent journal that I have by August 07. Faith and Philosophy is the journal put out by the Society of Christian Philosophers.
Friday, May 26, 2006
To Boston We Go!!!
My wife and I are going to Boston. Upon returning I will continue the outline of Naming and Necessity along with posting on some interesting topics in Augustine's The Trinity.
Thursday, May 11, 2006
Grad School Application -- yes, I missed a whole month of blogging
Well, I'm graduating from the University of Oklahoma with an MA in philosophy this Friday. However, that was not my goal in coming to OU, my goal was to graduate with a PhD. So, when I move from Oklahoma I hope to have a PhD or be well on my way to completing a PhD in philosophy. If I don't get a PhD, then I have failed in achieving my goal in coming to Oklahoma. However, now I am starting to believe that if I don't get into the PhD program it will be because of simple dumb luck more than anything else. It just seems that one mishap after another has been my experience at OU. I really don't know what to think about this whole experience. All I know is that if I don't get in, it is not my fault -- at least 100% my fault. I'll take maybe 25% of the blame. Obviously, I could have prevented much of this myself, yet, everytime that there has been a bounce of the ball, the ball has not bounced my way.
At the end of the day, God's soverignty is all that we can rely upon.
At the end of the day, God's soverignty is all that we can rely upon.
Tuesday, March 28, 2006
This is what a religion of peace looks like.
Deputy Attorney General Mohammed Eshak Aloko told the AP that prosecutors had issued a letter calling for Rahman's release because "he was mentally unfit to stand trial." He also said he did not know where he was being held.
He said Rahman may be sent overseas for medical treatment.
Hours earlier, hundreds of clerics, students and others chanting "Death to Christians!" marched through the northern Afghan Mazar-i-Sharif to protest the court's decision Sunday to dismiss the case.
"Abdul Rahman must be killed. Islam demands it," said senior Cleric Faiez Mohammed, from the nearby northern city of Kunduz. "The Christian foreigners occupying Afghanistan are attacking our religion."
Several Muslim clerics have threatened to incite Afghans to kill Rahman if he is freed, saying that he is clearly guilty of apostasy and deserves to die.
Rahman, 41, was arrested last month after police discovered him with a Bible. He was put on trial last week for converting 16 years ago while he was a medical aid worker for an international Christian group helping Afghan refugees in Pakistan. He had faced the death penalty under Afghanistan's Islamic laws.
He said Rahman may be sent overseas for medical treatment.
Hours earlier, hundreds of clerics, students and others chanting "Death to Christians!" marched through the northern Afghan Mazar-i-Sharif to protest the court's decision Sunday to dismiss the case.
"Abdul Rahman must be killed. Islam demands it," said senior Cleric Faiez Mohammed, from the nearby northern city of Kunduz. "The Christian foreigners occupying Afghanistan are attacking our religion."
Several Muslim clerics have threatened to incite Afghans to kill Rahman if he is freed, saying that he is clearly guilty of apostasy and deserves to die.
Rahman, 41, was arrested last month after police discovered him with a Bible. He was put on trial last week for converting 16 years ago while he was a medical aid worker for an international Christian group helping Afghan refugees in Pakistan. He had faced the death penalty under Afghanistan's Islamic laws.
Monday, March 27, 2006
Lecture 1 (some notes) part ii
Necessity
One of Kripke's major distinctions in necessity/contingent is that the necessary/contingent distinction is a metaphysical distinction. Whereas the a prior/a posteriori distinction is epistemological. Also, certainty, is an epistemological term. So for an x to be necessary, means that in any possible world W, x exists in W. An example of this is the Goldbach Conjecture, which states that any number n, greater than 2 that is a prime is odd. So for any two prime numbers that are greater than 2, p1 & p2, p1 + p2 does not equal n. If Goldbach's Conjecture is true, it is necessarily true, and if false, necessarily false. Yet, we don't have a priori knowledge of Goldbach's conjecture. If we ever do learn whether Goldbach's conjecture is true, we will know it a posteriori.
Kripke claims that a priori and necessity have been associated for two reasons. First, if something is is true in the actual world and true in all possible worlds, then we can see that in the other possible worlds that this statement is also a priori in other possible worlds. Although this does not seem correct. Second, if something is known a priori, then it must be necessary, since it was known without looking at the world. So Kripke's conclusion is that it isn't trivial to state that something is a priori necessary or to state that something is a posteriori contingent.
Kripke establishes the distinction between de re and de dicto modality by claiming that de re is essentialism. (I have never thought of de re in this way before.)
Here is an interesting puzzle, take the following two sentences:
'Nine is necessarily odd.'
'The number of planets is necessarily odd.'
Of course the first is true and the second is false.
Again, if we say that 'Nixon' was necessarily the president of the U.S. that is false. However, if we utter "'the man who won the election in 1968' is necessarily the winner of the election in 1968" this is true. Kripke will elaborate on this later, but this has something to do with fixing a referent. We cannot decide upon whether a property is essential or contingent without knowing the description, it is a meaningless question. Essential properties are what are used to establish identity across possible worlds, i.e. trans-world identity.
Names
What is the difference between the following two questions:
Is it necessary that 9 is greater than 7?
Is is necessary that the number of planets is greater than 7?
'9' is a rigid designator, meaning that in every possible world '9' designates the same object. Whereas descriptions, i.e. 'the number of planets', are contingent.
There is a non-circularity claim by Kripke for philosophical theories:
(C) For any useful theory, the accont must not be circular. The properties which are used in the vote must not themeselves involve the notion of reference in a way that is ultimately impossible to eliminate.
This principle seems to be aimed at Russell. For Russell defines a description as 'the so-and-so' (Kripke puts it as, 'the man called such and such'). Kripke doesn't elaborate much, and I may not understand Russell well enough to understand what is going on here. However, if one says, 'the man called "Walter Scott"', this violates (C).
One of Kripke's major distinctions in necessity/contingent is that the necessary/contingent distinction is a metaphysical distinction. Whereas the a prior/a posteriori distinction is epistemological. Also, certainty, is an epistemological term. So for an x to be necessary, means that in any possible world W, x exists in W. An example of this is the Goldbach Conjecture, which states that any number n, greater than 2 that is a prime is odd. So for any two prime numbers that are greater than 2, p1 & p2, p1 + p2 does not equal n. If Goldbach's Conjecture is true, it is necessarily true, and if false, necessarily false. Yet, we don't have a priori knowledge of Goldbach's conjecture. If we ever do learn whether Goldbach's conjecture is true, we will know it a posteriori.
Kripke claims that a priori and necessity have been associated for two reasons. First, if something is is true in the actual world and true in all possible worlds, then we can see that in the other possible worlds that this statement is also a priori in other possible worlds. Although this does not seem correct. Second, if something is known a priori, then it must be necessary, since it was known without looking at the world. So Kripke's conclusion is that it isn't trivial to state that something is a priori necessary or to state that something is a posteriori contingent.
Kripke establishes the distinction between de re and de dicto modality by claiming that de re is essentialism. (I have never thought of de re in this way before.)
Here is an interesting puzzle, take the following two sentences:
'Nine is necessarily odd.'
'The number of planets is necessarily odd.'
Of course the first is true and the second is false.
Again, if we say that 'Nixon' was necessarily the president of the U.S. that is false. However, if we utter "'the man who won the election in 1968' is necessarily the winner of the election in 1968" this is true. Kripke will elaborate on this later, but this has something to do with fixing a referent. We cannot decide upon whether a property is essential or contingent without knowing the description, it is a meaningless question. Essential properties are what are used to establish identity across possible worlds, i.e. trans-world identity.
Names
What is the difference between the following two questions:
Is it necessary that 9 is greater than 7?
Is is necessary that the number of planets is greater than 7?
'9' is a rigid designator, meaning that in every possible world '9' designates the same object. Whereas descriptions, i.e. 'the number of planets', are contingent.
There is a non-circularity claim by Kripke for philosophical theories:
(C) For any useful theory, the accont must not be circular. The properties which are used in the vote must not themeselves involve the notion of reference in a way that is ultimately impossible to eliminate.
This principle seems to be aimed at Russell. For Russell defines a description as 'the so-and-so' (Kripke puts it as, 'the man called such and such'). Kripke doesn't elaborate much, and I may not understand Russell well enough to understand what is going on here. However, if one says, 'the man called "Walter Scott"', this violates (C).
Lecture 1 - Naming and Necessity (some notes) part i
I'm reading through Naming and Necessity(hereafter N&N) for my paper on referring to God. N&N consists of three lectures by Saul Kripke, then after the lectures were transcribed he came back and wrote the preface. Kripke recommends that one read N&N in order of the lectures then read the preface. This is what I will do, starting with lecture 1, this morning, or this night, depending upon who you are.
One thing to remember about Kripke, he's a genius, a scary genius. However, he is notorious about having really thin-skin and not being able to withstand criticism. So there are many good and helpful arguments that he could attempt that would advance philosophy in general, that Kripke will not make. Simply, because Kripke can't stand criticism. So, many arguments that Kripke makes in N&N could be stronger, but to avoid being wrong, Kripke, hedges, haws, and hems.
Terminology:
'name' - proper name
'designator' - names and descriptions
'referent of the description' - the object uniquely satisfying the conditions in the definite description
Kripke's first substantive claim is that names are not definite descriptions. For Kripke, the form of a definite description is 'the x such that Fx'. However, The Holy Roman Empire and The United Nations aren't descriptions but names. This claim doesn't seem to be that controversial unless one is committed to a two-dimensional semantics of a sort.
Perhaps in mind here is Bertrand Russell (perhaps Frege too). For Russell, 'Walter Scott' is an abbreviation. The only names that exist are demonsratives such as 'this' or 'that' used in a particular manner when the speaker is acquainted with the object. Kripke differs from Russell, in that for Kripke names are not logically proper names and that descriptions have a sense. For a descriptivist theory of names, 'Napoleon' = 'the emperor of the French in the early part of the ninetheenth century; he was eventually defeated at Waterloo'. One of the problems with this theory that even Frege conceded is that names can have different senses. For instance 'Aristotle' could have the sense of 'the student of Plato' and another sense of 'the teacher of Alexander'. These senses are only contingent properties of Aristotle. So perhaps what we associate with names are really cluster of properties.
These clusters (Kripke also refers to them as families) can be used to either give meaning to a name, or fix the referent of the name. Really all the clusters can do is fix the referent of the name. For if we were to say, 'Aristotle didn't exist', then we would be saying something like, 'Aristotle has no meaning' which is a meaningless statement. So, the only option for the cluster theory is that it fixes reference.
One thing to remember about Kripke, he's a genius, a scary genius. However, he is notorious about having really thin-skin and not being able to withstand criticism. So there are many good and helpful arguments that he could attempt that would advance philosophy in general, that Kripke will not make. Simply, because Kripke can't stand criticism. So, many arguments that Kripke makes in N&N could be stronger, but to avoid being wrong, Kripke, hedges, haws, and hems.
Terminology:
'name' - proper name
'designator' - names and descriptions
'referent of the description' - the object uniquely satisfying the conditions in the definite description
Kripke's first substantive claim is that names are not definite descriptions. For Kripke, the form of a definite description is 'the x such that Fx'. However, The Holy Roman Empire and The United Nations aren't descriptions but names. This claim doesn't seem to be that controversial unless one is committed to a two-dimensional semantics of a sort.
Perhaps in mind here is Bertrand Russell (perhaps Frege too). For Russell, 'Walter Scott' is an abbreviation. The only names that exist are demonsratives such as 'this' or 'that' used in a particular manner when the speaker is acquainted with the object. Kripke differs from Russell, in that for Kripke names are not logically proper names and that descriptions have a sense. For a descriptivist theory of names, 'Napoleon' = 'the emperor of the French in the early part of the ninetheenth century; he was eventually defeated at Waterloo'. One of the problems with this theory that even Frege conceded is that names can have different senses. For instance 'Aristotle' could have the sense of 'the student of Plato' and another sense of 'the teacher of Alexander'. These senses are only contingent properties of Aristotle. So perhaps what we associate with names are really cluster of properties.
These clusters (Kripke also refers to them as families) can be used to either give meaning to a name, or fix the referent of the name. Really all the clusters can do is fix the referent of the name. For if we were to say, 'Aristotle didn't exist', then we would be saying something like, 'Aristotle has no meaning' which is a meaningless statement. So, the only option for the cluster theory is that it fixes reference.
Thursday, March 16, 2006
Propositional Attitudes and the Gospel
“Believe in the Lord Jesus, and you will be saved." (Acts 16:31 ESV)
So what does it mean to believe in the Lord Jesus. In this passage I am not quite sure how to take it, however, since I am a Millian heir, I will take the typically referentially opaque context to be substitutable with an identical name or description.
(1) Adam believes that 'Lord Jesus' - in English and he is saved.
However, (1) doesn't seem quite right, so let me try the following revision of (1):
(1') Adam believes in that 'Lord Jesus' in English and he is saved.
Although (1') seems a bit convoluted I'm going to stick with this construction for now. My next concern is how should we take "The Lord Jesus" in this context. 'The Lord Jesus' could either be a definite description or a proper name. As a definite description there is one unique person (or object) that 'The Lord Jesus' picks out and that is the person of Jesus Christ, the second member of the Trinity. 'The Lord Jesus' doesn't seem as if it were a proper name, rather, it seems to ascribe the property of Lordness to Jesus. Take a similar construction:
(2) The King Louis
or
(3) the King of France
Both (2) and (3) seem to be a bit unsimilar to 'The Lord Jesus', we aren't quite sure what Jesus is Lord of, where in (3) 'King' is the King of France, and (2) seems to be incomplete, however there could be several kings, and we could be referring to the King Louis, as opposed to the King Edward. So I think that we could take 'The Lord Jesus' as a definite description.
In this case 'Lord' refers to Yahweh, because 'kurios' is the word for 'Lord' in the Greek OT, so when the NT refers to Jesus as Lord, the NT is making a Trinitarian statement. So, we can get the following:
(4) Jesus is Lord.
(5) Jesus is Yahweh.
but we also hold to the following,
(6) The Father is Yahweh.
Therefore, (7) Jesus is the second member of the Trinity.
So, Jesus is identical with the second member of the Trinity. (I realize that I was brief in my argument from Jesus is Lord to infer that Jesus is identical with the second member of the Trinity, however I'm working on propositional attitudes in this post.)
So a new argument is as follows:
(8) Jesus = Second Member of the Trinity
(9) Adam believes in that - 'Jesus' in English, and Adam is saved.
(10) Adam believes in that - 'the Second Member of the Trinity' in English and is saved.
However my problem is with 'the second member fo the Trinity', because this appears to be a definite description and I am not sure if one can substitute proper names for definite descriptions.
... it's late, more to come later...
So what does it mean to believe in the Lord Jesus. In this passage I am not quite sure how to take it, however, since I am a Millian heir, I will take the typically referentially opaque context to be substitutable with an identical name or description.
(1) Adam believes that 'Lord Jesus' - in English and he is saved.
However, (1) doesn't seem quite right, so let me try the following revision of (1):
(1') Adam believes in that 'Lord Jesus' in English and he is saved.
Although (1') seems a bit convoluted I'm going to stick with this construction for now. My next concern is how should we take "The Lord Jesus" in this context. 'The Lord Jesus' could either be a definite description or a proper name. As a definite description there is one unique person (or object) that 'The Lord Jesus' picks out and that is the person of Jesus Christ, the second member of the Trinity. 'The Lord Jesus' doesn't seem as if it were a proper name, rather, it seems to ascribe the property of Lordness to Jesus. Take a similar construction:
(2) The King Louis
or
(3) the King of France
Both (2) and (3) seem to be a bit unsimilar to 'The Lord Jesus', we aren't quite sure what Jesus is Lord of, where in (3) 'King' is the King of France, and (2) seems to be incomplete, however there could be several kings, and we could be referring to the King Louis, as opposed to the King Edward. So I think that we could take 'The Lord Jesus' as a definite description.
In this case 'Lord' refers to Yahweh, because 'kurios' is the word for 'Lord' in the Greek OT, so when the NT refers to Jesus as Lord, the NT is making a Trinitarian statement. So, we can get the following:
(4) Jesus is Lord.
(5) Jesus is Yahweh.
but we also hold to the following,
(6) The Father is Yahweh.
Therefore, (7) Jesus is the second member of the Trinity.
So, Jesus is identical with the second member of the Trinity. (I realize that I was brief in my argument from Jesus is Lord to infer that Jesus is identical with the second member of the Trinity, however I'm working on propositional attitudes in this post.)
So a new argument is as follows:
(8) Jesus = Second Member of the Trinity
(9) Adam believes in that - 'Jesus' in English, and Adam is saved.
(10) Adam believes in that - 'the Second Member of the Trinity' in English and is saved.
However my problem is with 'the second member fo the Trinity', because this appears to be a definite description and I am not sure if one can substitute proper names for definite descriptions.
... it's late, more to come later...
Thursday, March 09, 2006
Propositional Attitudes
Let's say that there is someone, S, who believes a proposition, P. So there are two ways that S can believe a proposition:
(1) S believes P.
(2) S believes that P.
It is debated what the two differences are between (1) & (2), but one of the differences is that in (2) we would consider it referentially opaque. To illustrate what it means to be referentially opaque take the following example.
(3) Lois Lane loves Superman.
(4) Superman = Clark Kent.
(5) Lois Land does not love Clark Kent.
We could further elaborate on (3) & (5) into the following:
(3') Lois Lane believes that - 'I love Superman' - in English.
(5') Lois Lane believes that - 'I don't love Clark Kent' - in English.
Now we have a problem because Lois Lane has conflicting beliefs. She both loves and doesn't love Superman. How do we explain this? Usually we describe this as intensional beliefs. Although Superman and Clark Kent are members of the Kal El extension, they both present different intensional beliefs. So, 'Superman' is a different intension than 'Clark Kent'. Even though Superman = Clark Kent, since intensional attitudes are referentially opaque we cannot substitute Clark Kent and Superman.
However there is the Millian position that claims that a name exhausts its referent. So for the Millian one could take the name either 'Superman' or 'Clark Kent' and substitute them for each other. Although Lois Lane may not know that Clark Kent = Superman, Lois Lane does love the referent of 'Superman' and it just so happens that the referent of 'Superman' is the referent of 'Clark Kent'.
So, I will post more on this latter on how it relates to the gospel and belief in Jesus.
(1) S believes P.
(2) S believes that P.
It is debated what the two differences are between (1) & (2), but one of the differences is that in (2) we would consider it referentially opaque. To illustrate what it means to be referentially opaque take the following example.
(3) Lois Lane loves Superman.
(4) Superman = Clark Kent.
(5) Lois Land does not love Clark Kent.
We could further elaborate on (3) & (5) into the following:
(3') Lois Lane believes that - 'I love Superman' - in English.
(5') Lois Lane believes that - 'I don't love Clark Kent' - in English.
Now we have a problem because Lois Lane has conflicting beliefs. She both loves and doesn't love Superman. How do we explain this? Usually we describe this as intensional beliefs. Although Superman and Clark Kent are members of the Kal El extension, they both present different intensional beliefs. So, 'Superman' is a different intension than 'Clark Kent'. Even though Superman = Clark Kent, since intensional attitudes are referentially opaque we cannot substitute Clark Kent and Superman.
However there is the Millian position that claims that a name exhausts its referent. So for the Millian one could take the name either 'Superman' or 'Clark Kent' and substitute them for each other. Although Lois Lane may not know that Clark Kent = Superman, Lois Lane does love the referent of 'Superman' and it just so happens that the referent of 'Superman' is the referent of 'Clark Kent'.
So, I will post more on this latter on how it relates to the gospel and belief in Jesus.
Wednesday, March 01, 2006
Summer Plans
I've been slacking off on my blogging... a great deal. However, this summer I plan on posting critical reviews of the chapters of some books that I will read. This will accomplish a couple of things. First, it will improve my writing ability and force me to communicate difficult concepts into more simpler terms. Second, this will force me to read the books more carefully and allow me to learn more from them. Third, it will help my philosophy skillz, because I will be engaging in a philosophical dialogue with the books that I read.
Monday, February 20, 2006
It's been a while
Well, this has been one of the longest droughts that I have had in blog posting in recent history. I don't have much to say really. Currently I am just doing some assignments on Plato.
Hopefully I'll have more to say later.
Hopefully I'll have more to say later.
Sunday, January 29, 2006
Applied Doctrines
So, I have been thinking about a lot of different things lately. One item of interest that has been occupying my time lately is how do biblical doctrines apply to our lives. For instance take the doctrine of the Trinity, this is a foundational Christian doctrine, yet how does the Trinity effect the way that we live our lives. It seems that there are some big implications of this, and I think that I will try and sort some of them out tomorrow.
Two Thousand Years of Beautiful History
One think that frustrates me more than anything else is the neglect of orthodox Christian docrtine. By orthodox Christian doctrine I mean biblical doctrine, that is doctrine that one must believe in order for one to be a Christian. Christianity has been around for 2,0000 years and there have always been beliefs that Christians have held. So it always confuses me when people or churches find a new biblical teaching. Other times they just neglect Christian doctrine all together and just imply that we ought to act like Christians without doctrinal beliefs. I often wonder if I know what a Christian community looks like because I don't know if I have ever seen a genuine Christian community. I'm very concerned that the Christianity of America is not the Christianity of the Bible. I don't know why we ignore the basic biblical teachings in the Bible, but this is a serious problem in the U.S.
Saturday, January 28, 2006
Peace
I think that I am beginning to understand the following verse:
28 "Come to Me, all who are weary and heavy-laden, and I will give you rest. 29 "Take My yoke upon you and learn from Me, for I am gentle and humble in heart, and YOU WILL FIND REST FOR YOUR SOULS. 30 "For My yoke is easy and My burden is light."When we understand who God is and the relationship that we have with God through Jesus we realize that every situation is a learning experience. What does this mean? Well, God is soverign, therefore God knows what He is doing. Whenever we find ourself in a difficult spot or position it is because God has put us in that position. If we are having a difficult time it is because God is going to teach us something through that difficult time. I realize that nothing in my life is an accident, nothing is random, but everything is well-ordered and designed so that I may progress in my relationship with God. This is what brings me peace. The fact that God is in control and God is molding me into the person that God wants me to be.
Matt 11:28-30 (NASB95)
Thursday, January 19, 2006
I went to church and a rap concert broke out...
Has anyone heard the joke that goes along the following lines: I went to a fight and a hockey game broke out. What makes this joke funny is that there is so much fighting in a hockey game that the two are considered inseperable. Fighting is a part of hockey and vice versa.
Well, the other night when my wife and I were flipping through channels we watched several minutes of a church service. In this service the pastor/preacher was exhorting his congregation to clap, yell, and stand up among other things. Most rappers/rap groups have something called a 'hype man'. The paradigmatic example of a hype man is Flavor Flav. Flavor Flav's whole purpose was/is to get the crowd excited and cranked up. Joe C. was the hype man for Kid Rock. The hype man generally has no talent of his own other than to get the crowd's energy level to increase. This pastor/preacher my wife and I saw on T.V. seemed to have the sole purpose of increasing the crowd's energy. I really don't know how God is glorified when people that attend church to worship God get hyped up by the pastor. However, this pastor seemed to believe that he was getting these people in the pews to worship God. The most disturbing thing about the previous night is that this pastor is not alone in being a hype man for God. Many pastors are hype men for God. Church has become entertainment where people go to get emotionally hyped, then go home to continue with their lives as before.
Well, the other night when my wife and I were flipping through channels we watched several minutes of a church service. In this service the pastor/preacher was exhorting his congregation to clap, yell, and stand up among other things. Most rappers/rap groups have something called a 'hype man'. The paradigmatic example of a hype man is Flavor Flav. Flavor Flav's whole purpose was/is to get the crowd excited and cranked up. Joe C. was the hype man for Kid Rock. The hype man generally has no talent of his own other than to get the crowd's energy level to increase. This pastor/preacher my wife and I saw on T.V. seemed to have the sole purpose of increasing the crowd's energy. I really don't know how God is glorified when people that attend church to worship God get hyped up by the pastor. However, this pastor seemed to believe that he was getting these people in the pews to worship God. The most disturbing thing about the previous night is that this pastor is not alone in being a hype man for God. Many pastors are hype men for God. Church has become entertainment where people go to get emotionally hyped, then go home to continue with their lives as before.
Sunday, January 08, 2006
Life
You know life is a funny thing. If you stop to reflect upon what has happened, you begin to live in the past. If you think about the future you neglect the present. And, if you just live for the present, well, you mess up your future and eventually ruin your present. It seems the best way to live life is to emphasize all three aspects of one's life not neglecting any one over the others. However, even if one does this it still seems that life just slips away, this is where Christians seem to have hope. This is not all that we will experience, we will have eternal life. Yet, sometimes this eternal life seems so far away, so difficult to grasp, almost like a willow wisp. All too often Christians that I observe get caught up in the present life, what must I do to be happy, what are the seven keys to happiness? That type of concern. However, we cannot be so caught up in the future eternal life that we neglect this life either. It seems that the Christian life is a life of balance. So, we must realize that we ought to be willing to forsake all in this life for the sake of the future life, yet not neglect this life entirely due to our forward thinking about the future life. Both are important and ought to be considered when one makes a decision.
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