Deputy Attorney General Mohammed Eshak Aloko told the AP that prosecutors had issued a letter calling for Rahman's release because "he was mentally unfit to stand trial." He also said he did not know where he was being held.
He said Rahman may be sent overseas for medical treatment.
Hours earlier, hundreds of clerics, students and others chanting "Death to Christians!" marched through the northern Afghan Mazar-i-Sharif to protest the court's decision Sunday to dismiss the case.
"Abdul Rahman must be killed. Islam demands it," said senior Cleric Faiez Mohammed, from the nearby northern city of Kunduz. "The Christian foreigners occupying Afghanistan are attacking our religion."
Several Muslim clerics have threatened to incite Afghans to kill Rahman if he is freed, saying that he is clearly guilty of apostasy and deserves to die.
Rahman, 41, was arrested last month after police discovered him with a Bible. He was put on trial last week for converting 16 years ago while he was a medical aid worker for an international Christian group helping Afghan refugees in Pakistan. He had faced the death penalty under Afghanistan's Islamic laws.
Tuesday, March 28, 2006
Monday, March 27, 2006
Lecture 1 (some notes) part ii
Necessity
One of Kripke's major distinctions in necessity/contingent is that the necessary/contingent distinction is a metaphysical distinction. Whereas the a prior/a posteriori distinction is epistemological. Also, certainty, is an epistemological term. So for an x to be necessary, means that in any possible world W, x exists in W. An example of this is the Goldbach Conjecture, which states that any number n, greater than 2 that is a prime is odd. So for any two prime numbers that are greater than 2, p1 & p2, p1 + p2 does not equal n. If Goldbach's Conjecture is true, it is necessarily true, and if false, necessarily false. Yet, we don't have a priori knowledge of Goldbach's conjecture. If we ever do learn whether Goldbach's conjecture is true, we will know it a posteriori.
Kripke claims that a priori and necessity have been associated for two reasons. First, if something is is true in the actual world and true in all possible worlds, then we can see that in the other possible worlds that this statement is also a priori in other possible worlds. Although this does not seem correct. Second, if something is known a priori, then it must be necessary, since it was known without looking at the world. So Kripke's conclusion is that it isn't trivial to state that something is a priori necessary or to state that something is a posteriori contingent.
Kripke establishes the distinction between de re and de dicto modality by claiming that de re is essentialism. (I have never thought of de re in this way before.)
Here is an interesting puzzle, take the following two sentences:
'Nine is necessarily odd.'
'The number of planets is necessarily odd.'
Of course the first is true and the second is false.
Again, if we say that 'Nixon' was necessarily the president of the U.S. that is false. However, if we utter "'the man who won the election in 1968' is necessarily the winner of the election in 1968" this is true. Kripke will elaborate on this later, but this has something to do with fixing a referent. We cannot decide upon whether a property is essential or contingent without knowing the description, it is a meaningless question. Essential properties are what are used to establish identity across possible worlds, i.e. trans-world identity.
Names
What is the difference between the following two questions:
Is it necessary that 9 is greater than 7?
Is is necessary that the number of planets is greater than 7?
'9' is a rigid designator, meaning that in every possible world '9' designates the same object. Whereas descriptions, i.e. 'the number of planets', are contingent.
There is a non-circularity claim by Kripke for philosophical theories:
(C) For any useful theory, the accont must not be circular. The properties which are used in the vote must not themeselves involve the notion of reference in a way that is ultimately impossible to eliminate.
This principle seems to be aimed at Russell. For Russell defines a description as 'the so-and-so' (Kripke puts it as, 'the man called such and such'). Kripke doesn't elaborate much, and I may not understand Russell well enough to understand what is going on here. However, if one says, 'the man called "Walter Scott"', this violates (C).
One of Kripke's major distinctions in necessity/contingent is that the necessary/contingent distinction is a metaphysical distinction. Whereas the a prior/a posteriori distinction is epistemological. Also, certainty, is an epistemological term. So for an x to be necessary, means that in any possible world W, x exists in W. An example of this is the Goldbach Conjecture, which states that any number n, greater than 2 that is a prime is odd. So for any two prime numbers that are greater than 2, p1 & p2, p1 + p2 does not equal n. If Goldbach's Conjecture is true, it is necessarily true, and if false, necessarily false. Yet, we don't have a priori knowledge of Goldbach's conjecture. If we ever do learn whether Goldbach's conjecture is true, we will know it a posteriori.
Kripke claims that a priori and necessity have been associated for two reasons. First, if something is is true in the actual world and true in all possible worlds, then we can see that in the other possible worlds that this statement is also a priori in other possible worlds. Although this does not seem correct. Second, if something is known a priori, then it must be necessary, since it was known without looking at the world. So Kripke's conclusion is that it isn't trivial to state that something is a priori necessary or to state that something is a posteriori contingent.
Kripke establishes the distinction between de re and de dicto modality by claiming that de re is essentialism. (I have never thought of de re in this way before.)
Here is an interesting puzzle, take the following two sentences:
'Nine is necessarily odd.'
'The number of planets is necessarily odd.'
Of course the first is true and the second is false.
Again, if we say that 'Nixon' was necessarily the president of the U.S. that is false. However, if we utter "'the man who won the election in 1968' is necessarily the winner of the election in 1968" this is true. Kripke will elaborate on this later, but this has something to do with fixing a referent. We cannot decide upon whether a property is essential or contingent without knowing the description, it is a meaningless question. Essential properties are what are used to establish identity across possible worlds, i.e. trans-world identity.
Names
What is the difference between the following two questions:
Is it necessary that 9 is greater than 7?
Is is necessary that the number of planets is greater than 7?
'9' is a rigid designator, meaning that in every possible world '9' designates the same object. Whereas descriptions, i.e. 'the number of planets', are contingent.
There is a non-circularity claim by Kripke for philosophical theories:
(C) For any useful theory, the accont must not be circular. The properties which are used in the vote must not themeselves involve the notion of reference in a way that is ultimately impossible to eliminate.
This principle seems to be aimed at Russell. For Russell defines a description as 'the so-and-so' (Kripke puts it as, 'the man called such and such'). Kripke doesn't elaborate much, and I may not understand Russell well enough to understand what is going on here. However, if one says, 'the man called "Walter Scott"', this violates (C).
Lecture 1 - Naming and Necessity (some notes) part i
I'm reading through Naming and Necessity(hereafter N&N) for my paper on referring to God. N&N consists of three lectures by Saul Kripke, then after the lectures were transcribed he came back and wrote the preface. Kripke recommends that one read N&N in order of the lectures then read the preface. This is what I will do, starting with lecture 1, this morning, or this night, depending upon who you are.
One thing to remember about Kripke, he's a genius, a scary genius. However, he is notorious about having really thin-skin and not being able to withstand criticism. So there are many good and helpful arguments that he could attempt that would advance philosophy in general, that Kripke will not make. Simply, because Kripke can't stand criticism. So, many arguments that Kripke makes in N&N could be stronger, but to avoid being wrong, Kripke, hedges, haws, and hems.
Terminology:
'name' - proper name
'designator' - names and descriptions
'referent of the description' - the object uniquely satisfying the conditions in the definite description
Kripke's first substantive claim is that names are not definite descriptions. For Kripke, the form of a definite description is 'the x such that Fx'. However, The Holy Roman Empire and The United Nations aren't descriptions but names. This claim doesn't seem to be that controversial unless one is committed to a two-dimensional semantics of a sort.
Perhaps in mind here is Bertrand Russell (perhaps Frege too). For Russell, 'Walter Scott' is an abbreviation. The only names that exist are demonsratives such as 'this' or 'that' used in a particular manner when the speaker is acquainted with the object. Kripke differs from Russell, in that for Kripke names are not logically proper names and that descriptions have a sense. For a descriptivist theory of names, 'Napoleon' = 'the emperor of the French in the early part of the ninetheenth century; he was eventually defeated at Waterloo'. One of the problems with this theory that even Frege conceded is that names can have different senses. For instance 'Aristotle' could have the sense of 'the student of Plato' and another sense of 'the teacher of Alexander'. These senses are only contingent properties of Aristotle. So perhaps what we associate with names are really cluster of properties.
These clusters (Kripke also refers to them as families) can be used to either give meaning to a name, or fix the referent of the name. Really all the clusters can do is fix the referent of the name. For if we were to say, 'Aristotle didn't exist', then we would be saying something like, 'Aristotle has no meaning' which is a meaningless statement. So, the only option for the cluster theory is that it fixes reference.
One thing to remember about Kripke, he's a genius, a scary genius. However, he is notorious about having really thin-skin and not being able to withstand criticism. So there are many good and helpful arguments that he could attempt that would advance philosophy in general, that Kripke will not make. Simply, because Kripke can't stand criticism. So, many arguments that Kripke makes in N&N could be stronger, but to avoid being wrong, Kripke, hedges, haws, and hems.
Terminology:
'name' - proper name
'designator' - names and descriptions
'referent of the description' - the object uniquely satisfying the conditions in the definite description
Kripke's first substantive claim is that names are not definite descriptions. For Kripke, the form of a definite description is 'the x such that Fx'. However, The Holy Roman Empire and The United Nations aren't descriptions but names. This claim doesn't seem to be that controversial unless one is committed to a two-dimensional semantics of a sort.
Perhaps in mind here is Bertrand Russell (perhaps Frege too). For Russell, 'Walter Scott' is an abbreviation. The only names that exist are demonsratives such as 'this' or 'that' used in a particular manner when the speaker is acquainted with the object. Kripke differs from Russell, in that for Kripke names are not logically proper names and that descriptions have a sense. For a descriptivist theory of names, 'Napoleon' = 'the emperor of the French in the early part of the ninetheenth century; he was eventually defeated at Waterloo'. One of the problems with this theory that even Frege conceded is that names can have different senses. For instance 'Aristotle' could have the sense of 'the student of Plato' and another sense of 'the teacher of Alexander'. These senses are only contingent properties of Aristotle. So perhaps what we associate with names are really cluster of properties.
These clusters (Kripke also refers to them as families) can be used to either give meaning to a name, or fix the referent of the name. Really all the clusters can do is fix the referent of the name. For if we were to say, 'Aristotle didn't exist', then we would be saying something like, 'Aristotle has no meaning' which is a meaningless statement. So, the only option for the cluster theory is that it fixes reference.
Thursday, March 16, 2006
Propositional Attitudes and the Gospel
“Believe in the Lord Jesus, and you will be saved." (Acts 16:31 ESV)
So what does it mean to believe in the Lord Jesus. In this passage I am not quite sure how to take it, however, since I am a Millian heir, I will take the typically referentially opaque context to be substitutable with an identical name or description.
(1) Adam believes that 'Lord Jesus' - in English and he is saved.
However, (1) doesn't seem quite right, so let me try the following revision of (1):
(1') Adam believes in that 'Lord Jesus' in English and he is saved.
Although (1') seems a bit convoluted I'm going to stick with this construction for now. My next concern is how should we take "The Lord Jesus" in this context. 'The Lord Jesus' could either be a definite description or a proper name. As a definite description there is one unique person (or object) that 'The Lord Jesus' picks out and that is the person of Jesus Christ, the second member of the Trinity. 'The Lord Jesus' doesn't seem as if it were a proper name, rather, it seems to ascribe the property of Lordness to Jesus. Take a similar construction:
(2) The King Louis
or
(3) the King of France
Both (2) and (3) seem to be a bit unsimilar to 'The Lord Jesus', we aren't quite sure what Jesus is Lord of, where in (3) 'King' is the King of France, and (2) seems to be incomplete, however there could be several kings, and we could be referring to the King Louis, as opposed to the King Edward. So I think that we could take 'The Lord Jesus' as a definite description.
In this case 'Lord' refers to Yahweh, because 'kurios' is the word for 'Lord' in the Greek OT, so when the NT refers to Jesus as Lord, the NT is making a Trinitarian statement. So, we can get the following:
(4) Jesus is Lord.
(5) Jesus is Yahweh.
but we also hold to the following,
(6) The Father is Yahweh.
Therefore, (7) Jesus is the second member of the Trinity.
So, Jesus is identical with the second member of the Trinity. (I realize that I was brief in my argument from Jesus is Lord to infer that Jesus is identical with the second member of the Trinity, however I'm working on propositional attitudes in this post.)
So a new argument is as follows:
(8) Jesus = Second Member of the Trinity
(9) Adam believes in that - 'Jesus' in English, and Adam is saved.
(10) Adam believes in that - 'the Second Member of the Trinity' in English and is saved.
However my problem is with 'the second member fo the Trinity', because this appears to be a definite description and I am not sure if one can substitute proper names for definite descriptions.
... it's late, more to come later...
So what does it mean to believe in the Lord Jesus. In this passage I am not quite sure how to take it, however, since I am a Millian heir, I will take the typically referentially opaque context to be substitutable with an identical name or description.
(1) Adam believes that 'Lord Jesus' - in English and he is saved.
However, (1) doesn't seem quite right, so let me try the following revision of (1):
(1') Adam believes in that 'Lord Jesus' in English and he is saved.
Although (1') seems a bit convoluted I'm going to stick with this construction for now. My next concern is how should we take "The Lord Jesus" in this context. 'The Lord Jesus' could either be a definite description or a proper name. As a definite description there is one unique person (or object) that 'The Lord Jesus' picks out and that is the person of Jesus Christ, the second member of the Trinity. 'The Lord Jesus' doesn't seem as if it were a proper name, rather, it seems to ascribe the property of Lordness to Jesus. Take a similar construction:
(2) The King Louis
or
(3) the King of France
Both (2) and (3) seem to be a bit unsimilar to 'The Lord Jesus', we aren't quite sure what Jesus is Lord of, where in (3) 'King' is the King of France, and (2) seems to be incomplete, however there could be several kings, and we could be referring to the King Louis, as opposed to the King Edward. So I think that we could take 'The Lord Jesus' as a definite description.
In this case 'Lord' refers to Yahweh, because 'kurios' is the word for 'Lord' in the Greek OT, so when the NT refers to Jesus as Lord, the NT is making a Trinitarian statement. So, we can get the following:
(4) Jesus is Lord.
(5) Jesus is Yahweh.
but we also hold to the following,
(6) The Father is Yahweh.
Therefore, (7) Jesus is the second member of the Trinity.
So, Jesus is identical with the second member of the Trinity. (I realize that I was brief in my argument from Jesus is Lord to infer that Jesus is identical with the second member of the Trinity, however I'm working on propositional attitudes in this post.)
So a new argument is as follows:
(8) Jesus = Second Member of the Trinity
(9) Adam believes in that - 'Jesus' in English, and Adam is saved.
(10) Adam believes in that - 'the Second Member of the Trinity' in English and is saved.
However my problem is with 'the second member fo the Trinity', because this appears to be a definite description and I am not sure if one can substitute proper names for definite descriptions.
... it's late, more to come later...
Thursday, March 09, 2006
Propositional Attitudes
Let's say that there is someone, S, who believes a proposition, P. So there are two ways that S can believe a proposition:
(1) S believes P.
(2) S believes that P.
It is debated what the two differences are between (1) & (2), but one of the differences is that in (2) we would consider it referentially opaque. To illustrate what it means to be referentially opaque take the following example.
(3) Lois Lane loves Superman.
(4) Superman = Clark Kent.
(5) Lois Land does not love Clark Kent.
We could further elaborate on (3) & (5) into the following:
(3') Lois Lane believes that - 'I love Superman' - in English.
(5') Lois Lane believes that - 'I don't love Clark Kent' - in English.
Now we have a problem because Lois Lane has conflicting beliefs. She both loves and doesn't love Superman. How do we explain this? Usually we describe this as intensional beliefs. Although Superman and Clark Kent are members of the Kal El extension, they both present different intensional beliefs. So, 'Superman' is a different intension than 'Clark Kent'. Even though Superman = Clark Kent, since intensional attitudes are referentially opaque we cannot substitute Clark Kent and Superman.
However there is the Millian position that claims that a name exhausts its referent. So for the Millian one could take the name either 'Superman' or 'Clark Kent' and substitute them for each other. Although Lois Lane may not know that Clark Kent = Superman, Lois Lane does love the referent of 'Superman' and it just so happens that the referent of 'Superman' is the referent of 'Clark Kent'.
So, I will post more on this latter on how it relates to the gospel and belief in Jesus.
(1) S believes P.
(2) S believes that P.
It is debated what the two differences are between (1) & (2), but one of the differences is that in (2) we would consider it referentially opaque. To illustrate what it means to be referentially opaque take the following example.
(3) Lois Lane loves Superman.
(4) Superman = Clark Kent.
(5) Lois Land does not love Clark Kent.
We could further elaborate on (3) & (5) into the following:
(3') Lois Lane believes that - 'I love Superman' - in English.
(5') Lois Lane believes that - 'I don't love Clark Kent' - in English.
Now we have a problem because Lois Lane has conflicting beliefs. She both loves and doesn't love Superman. How do we explain this? Usually we describe this as intensional beliefs. Although Superman and Clark Kent are members of the Kal El extension, they both present different intensional beliefs. So, 'Superman' is a different intension than 'Clark Kent'. Even though Superman = Clark Kent, since intensional attitudes are referentially opaque we cannot substitute Clark Kent and Superman.
However there is the Millian position that claims that a name exhausts its referent. So for the Millian one could take the name either 'Superman' or 'Clark Kent' and substitute them for each other. Although Lois Lane may not know that Clark Kent = Superman, Lois Lane does love the referent of 'Superman' and it just so happens that the referent of 'Superman' is the referent of 'Clark Kent'.
So, I will post more on this latter on how it relates to the gospel and belief in Jesus.
Wednesday, March 01, 2006
Summer Plans
I've been slacking off on my blogging... a great deal. However, this summer I plan on posting critical reviews of the chapters of some books that I will read. This will accomplish a couple of things. First, it will improve my writing ability and force me to communicate difficult concepts into more simpler terms. Second, this will force me to read the books more carefully and allow me to learn more from them. Third, it will help my philosophy skillz, because I will be engaging in a philosophical dialogue with the books that I read.
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